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Developments in Change Management in Portuguese Central Administration: the 
dilemma between hierarchy and agencification 
 
 
Joaquim Filipe Ferraz Esteves de Araújo1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The creation of autonomous organisations (such as agencies) in government has been a 
trend in many OECD countries influenced by ‘New Public Management’ ideas on 
methods of how to organise the public sector.  The arguments about this convergence of 
administrative reforms towards new organisational forms which ‘work better and cost 
less’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) has been challenged by academics who argue that 
there are differences in the ways that the agency model has been introduced in the 
various countries (James, 1999; Pollitt, 2000).  Hood (1996) makes evident the existing 
variations in public management reforms, which oppose the inevitable convergence 
proposed by Osborne and Gaebler (1992).  Meanwhile, James (1999) argues that the 
agency model developed in the UK and imported by other countries is influenced by 
local corporate governance arrangements.  Pollitt (2000) points out that in several 
countries agency development is a superficial phenomenon, harbouring within itself 
differences of political and administrative culture, political purpose and organisational 
behaviour and that it is little more than a ‘shell of an idea’. 
The paper examines the influence of New Public Management ideas on recent 
management change in Portuguese central administration.  Within the ministries, the 
search for effectiveness in policy implementation is driving major changes, stressing the 
reorganisation through ‘autonomisation’ of government bodies that have traditionally 
belonged to the hierarchy of central departments under strong supervision.  The trend 
among ministries to set up autonomous organisations seems to follow the example of 
other countries towards ‘autonomisation’ and decentralisation inspired by the practice of 
the private sector and New Public Management which stresses managerial flexibility.  
Hence, it is worth investigating how the idea of agencies has been adopted in 
Portuguese central administration.  The analysis uses the political and sociological 
version of new institutionalism to understand the process of autonomisation.  Firstly, it 
defines the concept of agency and outlines its key characteristics and features; secondly, 
it analyses the process of autonomisation.  It argues that despite the influence of NMP 
ideas, autonomisation follows the public values, political and societal context in which 
the change takes place and influences the process of autonomisation. 
 
 
 
The NPM and the agency concept 
 
 
Administrative reform has been dominated by the ‘New Public Management’ (Hood, 
1991, 1995) framework, which emerged from a new managerial ethic supporting the 
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view that managers have ‘the right to manage’ (Flynn, 1993).  Some particular features 
of this form are (Hood, 1991): 
 
a) the breaking up of traditional structures into semi-autonomous units 
responsible for central government activities; 
b) the freedom to manage by discretionary power and visible managers at 
the top; 
c) the clear statements of goals and targets measurable as indicators of 
success; 
d) resource allocation and rewards linked to performance; 
e) a shift from a unitary civil service toward the diversity of working 
conditions, reward systems and career mobility; 
 
Other arguments are that there is a belief among reformers that NPM methods 
provide new means of organising the public sector being more efficient and effective 
than traditional bureaucracy (Peters and Wright, 1998). 
 The fragmentation of government and administration through agency creation 
has been a widespread trend in several countries; being the most important of these the 
structural changes in European reforms (Peters, 1997).  Agency creation is not new2 but 
the influence of UK reforms and the agency model derived from the ‘Next Steps’ 
initiative was a benchmark that spread this form to organise the public sector.  
Ministries are fragmented into autonomous organisations decentralising and devolving 
their powers to them, a process which some authors claim is producing similar forms of 
administrative organisations (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  However, there is 
considerable academic literature about how these forms have been adopted by 
governments in many countries that refuse deterministic arguments for convergence 
towards NPM and the adoption of similar models of agencies (Pollitt, 2000; Polidano et 
al, 1998). 
 Management change in Portuguese central administration has followed this 
trend.  There is a NPM-flavoured set of policies of which the creation of autonomous 
organisations seems to be a good example.  Several ministries undergo major 
reorganisation through the creation of public institutes (PI), which are a similar form of 
agencies.  Public institutes are instruments of flexibility and agility of public service 
delivery that join the traditional management of public organisations with methods of 
the private sector.  Its creation does not follow a specific reform programme or a 
specific model but is the result of individual ministerial initiatives which emphasis the 
revitalisation of these autonomous organisational forms that exist in the juridical 
administrative regime.  It is a trend among ministries that has become stronger during 
the last years, in part influenced by experiences in other countries, by the need to over 
take the strict administrative law constraints in public services management and partly 
as an expedient to overcome bureaucratic resistance. 
 Administrative studies about change in organisations have been influenced by 
the new institutionalism approach to political and sociological science (see March and 
Olsen, 1989 and Scott, 1995).  According to March and Olsen (1989) the process of 
institutional change follows the internal dynamic according to an institution’s origin and 
history.  Individual choices are made in light of previous experiences in comparable 
situations and in conformity with standards of obligation.  Institutions shape the 
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definition of alternatives and influence the perception and construction of the reality in 
which action takes place (March and Olsen, 1996).  By institution I mean the normative 
and regulative structures that create a framework in which social interactions take place 
and establish the norms, rules and routines that are embedded in the culture.  This 
approach is appropriate for studying the creation of public institutes and how the 
constitutional, legal and cultural constraints limited the option available.  It suggests 
that public institutes will reproduce certain features that are embedded in the existing 
rules, routines and culture and are the source of continuity.  It analyses how the idea of 
agency derives from other experiences that have been introduced in Portuguese central 
administration and what are the continuities thereof. 
 
 
 
The Context of Change 
 
 
The structure of Portuguese central government and the evolution of ministries and their 
higher and lower level units are in constant change.  Reorganisations usually involve 
moving organisations from one ministry to another, abolishing or merging units or 
simply changing their names.  It simply involves the rearranging of parts of the different 
organisations, which are moved like blocks in a kind of ‘cube game’ (Araújo, 1999).  It 
becomes a ‘routine’ whenever a new government takes power and usually has influence 
only on formal issues of public administration. 
 Central public administration consists of legal entities that are under state 
tutelage and supervision, following the hierarchical and centralised administrative 
model based on the French Napoleon type of state.  The so-called direct administration 
of which are part the directorates-general, directorates, departments, division and other 
operational units have no administrative or financial autonomy.  The competence to 
carry out administrative acts and to authorise expenditure belongs to their parent 
ministries, to whom they request prior authorisation.  These bodies operate under a web 
of regulations and administrative controls, which drastically limits their managerial 
freedom and follows the formal and legalistic approach to resource management.  They 
exhibit much of the dysfunction associated with traditional bureaucracy that was 
accentuated by a legal system, which had become suffocated in its own procedures and 
self-importance.  These constraints reduced the effectiveness of policy implementation, 
increased the burden of resources and the ability to quickly respond to the challenges 
posed by society. 
 A second group of legal entities under the tutelage of ministers but distinct from 
the government is the public institutes (PI).3  These bodies perform their activity in the 
public domain and have no commercial nature.  They have financial and administrative 
autonomy, which means that they have full competence to carry out administrative acts 
and the freedom to spend its funds up to a certain limit without previous permission. 
They have their own revenues and a private budget that is a part of the budget approved 
by the Assembly.  This form of power devolution is aimed at improving the 
implementation of executive tasks.  The creation of these autonomous organisations was 
for a long time limited, usually for specific activities like higher education, hospitals 
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and research.  The public institutes are similar to the French ‘établissement public’, the 
German ‘öffentliche Anstalten’ the Spanish ‘organismo autónomo’ and, in Italy, the 
‘enti publici’. 
 Portugal has a formal, centralised and hierarchical bureaucracy, plagued by rules 
and regulations, having to rigidly budget, having a rigid personnel system and 
preoccupied with legal control.  Directorates-general, the traditional form of structuring 
central government, are seen as bureaucratic, old-fashioned, legalistic and hierarchical 
organisations which do not respond appropriately to the dynamics of change and some 
politicians regard them as an obstacle to the effectiveness of policy implementation.  
Since the 1974’s democratic revolution, there has been a trend to strengthen ministerial 
influence in public administration in order to reduce the traditional power of 
bureaucracy, which Portuguese senior officials call the ‘progressive abolition of 
directorates’ (Araújo, 1999).  On the other hand, it is believed among politicians that PI 
work better because they are under a more moderate juridical regime than the 
directorates-general, particularly, in what concerns their funding and personnel 
management.  Hence, managerial autonomy would lead to efficacy in public service 
delivery and ministerial reorganisation would abolish directorates and replace them by 
PI.  Public institutes and similar organisational forms become the fashionable format for 
policy implementation.   
Management for change followed incremental modifications of existing 
arrangements through the revitalisation of PI.  The search for managerial flexibility and 
‘new’ organisational forms are challenging the administrative structure and changing 
the traditional concept of governance.  But the fragmentation of central structures in 
Portugal did not follow the extent that literature on the macroscopic changes suggests in 
the public sector producing a less coherent apparatus for governance (see Peters and 
Wright, 1998, Stewart and Walsh, 1992 and Dunleavy, 1997). In the Portuguese case, 
there is movement towards a more complex activity reducing the strict administrative 
legal control and opening up the participation in public management and policy 
implementation to others actors. 
 
 
 
The Agencification Process in Central Administration 
 
 
As in other OECD countries, administrative reform in Portugal is looking for different 
ways of doing things but within the administrative context (Klages and Loffler, 1995).  
Public institutes are not new organisations but there is a renovating approach in their 
creation and structuring which, in itself, suggests a departing from the traditional 
operating procedures that point to a breakage in uniformity.  Its number is increasing 
over time.  Table 1 shows the evolution of PI. 
 
 
Table 1 - Evolution of Public Institutes 
 
1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
22 55 74 173 250 328 
        Source: MREAP, 2001. 
 
There is an increase in PI, a phenomenon that seems to be similar to the Italian 
case where they have quickly flourished among ministries (Galli, 1996).  In the year 
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2000, there were 328 public institutes.  Some of them are just the result of small 
changes in the legal statute of previous organisation, of the centralisation or the 
fragmentation of abolished organisations and, others, are new organisations.  Table 2 
shows the number of PI by ministry. 
 
 
Table 2 - Number of Public Institutes by Ministry 
 
Ministry  
Ministry of Internal Administration 4 
Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fishery 8 
Ministry of Environment and Territory Administration 8 
Ministry of Science and Technology 8 
Ministry of Culture 18 
Ministry of National Defence 1 
Ministry of Economy 29 
Ministry of Education 38 
Ministry of Social Equipment 18 
Ministry of Finances 11 
Ministry of Justice 7 
Ministry of Youth and Sports 4 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 6 
Ministry of Planning 1 
Ministry of State Reform and Public Administration 4 
Ministry of Work and Solidarity 16 
Ministry of Wealth 143 
Presidency of Council of Ministers 6 
       Source: MREAP, 2001. 
 
The move towards autonomisation did not change the centralised nature of 
public administration.  The geographic distribution of PI among the country shows its 
concentration in the capital (Lisbon). 
 
 
Table 3 - Percentage of Public Institutes by Region 
 
Region  
Lisbon 48 % 
Porto 9 % 
Other cities 43 % 
             Source: MREAP, 2001. 
 
 The distribution shows the centralised nature of Portuguese government with 
48% of PI located in the capital (Lisbon).  Actually, in 1996, there were 81.1% civil 
servants working in central administration.  It is worth stressing that the percentage of 
PI in other cities included hospitals and polythenic schools.  The creation of PI is not a 
decentralising activity. 
Among the ministries, there is a great diversity of PI and some diverge from the 
original requirements for creation.  Some have great autonomy working under a mixture 
of administrative law and private law.  While others, work within a model similar to the 
directorate-general but with administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy.  The 
diversity of juridical regimes and its influence in management becomes an issue in the 
administrative reform agenda.  The reform is not based on the rule of administrative 
law, foundations of public organisations management, but on adopting private law 
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within the administrative system, which allows for more flexibility in resource 
management.  However, whilst in other countries the reasons to create agencies are the 
result of financial, legitimacy and quality problems (Pollitt, Bathgate and Talbolt, 2000) 
in Portugal, the main purpose of politicians in choosing public institutes as a model to 
structure ministries is that of improving the co-ordination and effectiveness of policy 
implementation.  The connecting of the administrative juridical regime with the private 
juridical regime shows a sign of entrepreneurship in PI and in its managerial boards. 
However, there is concern amongst political parties and other social forces about 
the boom of public institutes and the variety of models that are emerging.  Some critical 
commentators claim that this process is an expedient to over take administrative legal 
control of resource management and overtake financial constraints.  A device used by 
politicians to look for ways to bypass the rigidity of financial control mechanisms and 
bureaucratic procedures.  An opinion shared by the minister responsible for 
administrative reform who states that there is a trend to run away from the 
administrative juridical regime through exceptional juridical regimes.  According to 
him, public institutes and similar organisations with autonomy are spread about in order 
to make management easier.  This flexibility does not mean efficiency and efficacy.  
These mechanisms are set up to turn around financial controls (Público, 15/6/2000). 
This diversity of PI seems to go against the regularity and uniformity of 
Portuguese public administration whose structures are established according to a legal 
framework.  There was a need to establish a legal framework to regulate the creation, 
management and the functioning of public institutes in order to discipline the 
agencification process.  These were the reasons for the government to set up a task force 
to study and propose the rationalisation of these organisations.  The task force proposed 
a draft Law concerning the rules and principles to create public institutes. 
 
 
 
From Direct Administration to ‘Autonomisation’ 
 
 
The case of the Fiscal General Administration (AGT) 
 
The Fiscal administration has three directorates-general responsible for policy 
implementation: the Directorate-general of Taxes (DGI), who is responsible for direct 
and indirect tax policies; the Directorate-general of Customs and Special Taxes 
(DGAIEC), who is responsible for the external border of EU customs-duties and other 
special taxes; a third directorate-general (DGITA) responsible for giving advice and 
support in IT issues.  The co-ordination among these directorates was critical in policy 
implementation.  To improve the co-ordination of activities among them, a Council of 
Directors-general was established in 1997.  The council, however, was limited in its 
ability to co-ordinate the directorates and in its powers to introduce changes in fiscal 
administration.  On the other hand, fraud and tax evasion pressures the changes 
undergone in policy administration. 
 Reform in the tax administration concentrates mainly on structural issues 
through the creation of a public institute – the Fiscal General Administration 
(Administração Geral Tributária-AGT) – which integrates, as operational units, the 
above mentioned directorates-general.  The model is closed-off to the corporate form 
borrowed from the private sector and uses the multi-divisional firm model.  The 
directorates are ‘organisational units’ organised by type of product under the 
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responsibility of a single person, the Director-General, under a strong central 
organisation to co-ordinate the different units, the AGT.  This kind of ‘private sector 
model’ is similar to the Danish experience consisting of a holding company (the AGT) 
and a number of divisions (the directorates) (Jørgensen and Hansen, 1995). 
 Managerial boards of AGT are collegiate but with a kind of chief executive, the 
President.  At the very top is the High Fiscal Council (HFC) with a strategic policy role 
that sets up the guidelines for AGT services and the priorities and objectives in policy- 
making and policy implementation.  The HFC is chaired by the Minister of Finance; the 
other members are the Secretary of State for Fiscal Issues, the president of the Directive 
Council and three Directors-generals.  The executive board, which is the Directive 
Council (DC), is composed by the President and two outside members appointed by the 
minister and the three Directors-general.  The DC is responsible for the general 
management of AGT in issues like personnel, budget, patrimony and contracting out 
services.  The President is the chair of DC and has devolved powers concerning the 
AGT management.  Indeed, despite the rule of collegiate decisions, he can make 
decisions without the approval of the DC and cancel its decisions.  To follow the 
evolution of the fiscal system and advise in policy implementation, there is a 
consultative board, the Tax National Council, whose members are the social partners 
and the directive staff of the above mentioned directorates-general.  General services 
includes an Audit Service responsible for inspecting and auditing the management of 
AGT and the other directorates; a Centre for Policy Advice and Evaluation; an Institute 
for training and a Service responsible for strategic planning of information systems.  All 
members of these collegiate boards are appointed by the minister for a three year 
mandate. 
This new structure is in response to improving effectiveness in fiscal policy 
implementation and management through the co-ordination and control between 
services.  The AGT centralises policy management and increases ministerial control 
linking policy formulation with policy implementation.  It is responsible for the co-
ordination, strategic planning and control of directorates-general and, also, responsible 
for tax collection and the management of common services to these directorates.  The 
AGT is a step towards co-ordination into ‘high politics’ that emphasises hard political 
choices rather than more managerial decisions common in administration.  It is an 
innovative way of ministerial supervision and control given that the minister is involved 
in policy implementation.  It adopted a ‘bottom-up’ process, with central boards 
promoting the co-operation among subordinate organisations.  The reorganisation 
increased the role of non-governmental organisations in policy formulation and policy 
making through the participation in collegiate boards.  There is a change in governance 
but this does not mean a devolution of power to lower echelons of government.   
 
 
The case of the Institute of Solidarity and Social Security (ISSS) 
 
Implementation of social security policy followed a decentralised model with five 
public institutes (the Regional Centres of Social Security-CRSS) having been 
responsible for policy administration.  However, seventeen years after this 
decentralisation the Government admits that the target of the five CRSS has not been 
achieved: there was low managerial effectiveness in policy management, the waste of 
resources (financial, technical and human), the absence of strategic planning and the 
lack of co-ordination (Decree-Law 316-A/2000).  For instance, in social security policy 
implementation, each CRSS follows its own strategy without lateral communication, 
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which leads to the development of five computer systems among the operational 
organisations that can not exchange data with each other.  Hence, this made it 
impossible to cross information and monitor policy administration (Público, 
15/06/2000).  It hampered the efficacy of policy implementation and the control of 
beneficiaries.  There is an inefficient way in which the collection of contributions is 
administered.  It leads to large contributors arrears, which had mounted to about 2.6% 
of GDP in 1996 (OECD, 1996).  Moreover, there were among operative services 
differences in service delivery that went against the constitutional principle of 
uniformity of service to all citizens. 
The failure of co-ordination among the decentralised regional centres was the 
main reason to reorganise the public institutes responsible for policy implementation.  
The regional centres were abolished having had their responsibilities centralised in a 
single public institute (the Institute of Solidarity and Social Security-ISSS) and the 
organisation responsible for pension payments (the National Centre for Pensions) 
becomes its functional unit.  Hence, it has concentrated six PI in one large institute.  The 
reorganisation abolished, as well, other organisations in the ministry and replaced them 
with other public institutes. 
The ISSS centralised decision-making and the implementation of  social security 
and social action policy in order to improve the co-ordination of policy implementation 
and ‘to deal with all citizens in the same form throughout the country’ (Decree-Law 
316-A/2000).  The new model transferred more responsibilities of implementation to a 
district level and centralised strategic planning to the ISSS.  The co-ordination between 
the ISSS and the five region plan is done by Regional Delegates who are responsible for 
planning, to assure the uniformity of service delivery throughout the country and to 
inspect payments made of social security benefits.  Managerial boards in ISSS are 
collegiate.  There is an executive board, the Directive Council (DC), with nine 
members: a president, two deputy presidents and six outside members.  The president is 
a kind of ‘chief executive’ as in the AGT.  The Consultative Council (CC) is 
responsible for giving advice about the overall strategy, giving an opinion about the 
issues submitted to them and about the annual planning and activity report.  Its members 
are the top managers of the social security organisations, the presidents of associations 
of NGOs, a representative of unions and enterprises associations and a representative of 
the association of pensioners.  An Audit Commission with three members is responsible 
for scrutinising the management of the ISSS. 
 The ISSS aims, as well, at improving service delivery making borderlines more 
permeable for citizens with a customer-oriented working pattern through a network of 
front offices.  Service delivery will follow the improvements of other reform 
experiences through the creation of a national network of 100 front offices called 
‘Solidarity Shops’, a kind of ‘Citizen Shops’ (for details about Citizen Shops see 
Araújo, 2001) responsible for all issues related to the social security benefits. 
 
 
Management in Public Institutes 
 
The governance management in PI is influenced by the private sector corporate 
governance, as in other countries (James, 1999).  Usually the governance arrangement 
of PI has a president, a directive board, and an audit board like the private sector 
organisations.  However, the majority of PI have a consultative board for interest 
representation (unions, federations of enterprises, non profit organisations, local 
authorities representatives) to discuss the activities connected to the institute or the 
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organisations under its supervision.  This is a way to involve the stakeholders of the 
organisations to find new alternatives for problem solving.  For instances, in the 
Ministry of Work and Solidarity the Institute for Social Development and the Institute 
for Solidarity and Social Security have such boards (Decree-law 433-A/99; Decree-law 
316-A/2000). 
 
 
Table 4 - Corporate Governance Arrangements 
 
Private Sector Public Institutes 
President President 
Collegiate Executive Board Collegiate Directive Board 
Collegiate Audit Board Collegiate Audit Board 
 Collegiate Consultative Board 
 
As stated above the administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy of public 
institutes allowed the adoption of a more open juridical regime in their management, 
particularly in two critical issues: financial management and personnel management. 
 The rule-drive financial management has been replaced by the implementation 
of a more elaborate planning and reporting system through annual activities plans, 
annual budgets, balance sheets and annual financial reports.  Public institutes work 
within their specified budgets and with targets established in their annual activity plans 
and, in same cases, they have a three year plan.  It is worth noting that, as experienced 
in other countries, the agencification takes place after the financial management reform 
to enable control of functions4. But the financial reform in Portugal is a long process, 
which started in late 1980 and, only in 1998 were the first proposals implemented.  On 
the other hand, budget cuts and cost savings are not, at this stage, a priority in public 
institutes management.  The focus on public management is not merely on effectiveness 
and efficiency.  This is why performance measurement and performance indicators were 
not introduced at this stage.  However, a general issue is emerging among the creation 
of institutes that is an important component of New Public Management: the strategic 
planning and the reporting system. 
 Personnel management is moving from the rigid system of civil service towards 
a more flexible employment system.  A common characteristic in the statute of public 
institutes about personnel management is recruitment by individual contract.  However, 
as the majority of staff comes from the abolished public organisations, the statute of PI 
allows them to opt for the civil service system or for the individual contract.  As long as 
the civil service system is more advantageous (at least in job stability and retirement 
pensions) the larger majority of staff prefers to stay in the civil service system which 
limits personnel management flexibility due to its rigidity.  In the long term, however, 
this will allow a gradual shift to take place, thus, bringing the public service more in 
line with private labour conditions.  Personnel management in public institutes is made 
according to two or three systems: the individual contract, the civil service system and 
the specific employment regime of social security organisations.  Hence, the adoption of 
NPM ideas is made gradually preserving the civil servants statute. 
In what concerns the managers, these are appointed by the Prime Minister on 
suggestion of the minister responsible for the three-year mandate and most of them 
work under the statute of public manager.  This means that they will have higher wages 
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that do not come under the regime of the civil service statute and its salary structure.  
The flexibility to negotiate salaries is important in retaining skilled professionals in 
competitive job positions and attracting new skilled professionals to the public sector.  
In some ministries, this flexibility was the main reason for some directorates-general to 
change to the public institute statute.  Otherwise, it would be very difficult to retain the 
best-qualified staff.  However, the minister responsible for administrative reform is 
critical about the developments in personnel management.  He points out that flexibility 
in personnel management is always used to increase public expenditures, costs and 
inefficiency.  He says that there is little concern to reduce public employment, 
promoting retirements, mobility of personnel or to promote training adjusted to 
professional needs.  Usually, civil servants’ wages in public institutes join the best of 
two worlds: a competitive salary with the private sector and the privilege belonging to 
the public sector, with stable employment and retirement benefits (Martins, 2000). 
Personnel management has been a difficult issue in Portuguese Public 
Administration, particularly the growth of personnel expenditures.  Public debit is 
increasing every year and it seems difficult for the government to control this growth.  
For instance, according to the Bank of Portugal’s report (2000), personnel expenditures 
increased 6.5% in 1996, 6.6% in 1997, 9.4% in 1998 and 9.2% in 1999.  In overall, 
there was ‘a strong growth of primary current expenditure of 1.2% of the GDP’.  As 
was argued above, the movement towards agencification has little to do with ‘doing 
more with less’.  The argument that has spread throughout many countries that claims 
that the government must ‘do more with less’ just does not fit Portugal, where it is more 
appropriate to say ‘to provide better spending for more’ (Araújo, 2001). 
 
 
 
Public Governance 
 
 
The autonomisation of central public organisations does not follow the strict managerial 
prescription patterns that stresses the separation of politics from management.  The 
main tasks of public institutes are the execution of operational tasks, according to the 
responsibilities set up on their legal statute.  However, these executive tasks are not at 
an ‘arm’s length’ of policy-making departments an in other countries (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000).  It does not mean that the state has been ‘rolled back’ (Steel and 
Head, 1984) and ‘hollowed out’ (Rhodes, 1997).  On the contrary, the minister 
continues to have the political and administrative responsibility for activities in PI.  The 
responsibility to achieve the results belongs to the president of the institute, but 
ministers remain accountable to parliament. 
However, there is movement from the hierarchical source of co-ordination 
towards a more complex one.  Governance is based on political confidence and the 
powers of tutelage and superintendence.  Tutelage means that the member of 
government responsible can interfere directly in the service management by sanctioning 
their decisions, inspecting and cancelling their decisions.  In some cases, the tutelage 
power overlaps the powers of the directive board (Araújo, 2000) or they are vague 
depending on the ministry and on public institute.  Superintendence means that the 
member of government responsible for the public institute can give general orientation 
and recommendations to managerial boards about objectives and priorities.  The 
politicisation of collegiate boards of public institutes strengthens the ministerial control. 
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The authority of the minister is felt, which means that the public institutes are 
formally an extension of the minister’s constitutional and legal power.  As a 
consequence, directive boards and presidents of public institutes, despite their 
‘autonomy’, are limited in their decisions by the minister who can turn them into a kind 
of ‘direct subordinates’ of the parents’ departments.  It is usual for ministers to cancel 
decisions made by the public institutes or substitute the presidents to deal with current 
issues.  So, whether public institutes aim at freeing civil servants as to be able to 
manage in a more flexible and professional way is ambiguous.  There is more freedom 
from the administrative law concerning day- to- day management, but they continue to 
be very dependent on the minister.  The model did not shift very far out the activities of 
the government (Pollitt, 2000) and, the business-economic thinking in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency did not dominate. 
 The autonomisation is not only a question of managerialism but of public 
governance and legitimacy as well.  Basic public values like democracy, equity, 
impartiality, justice, uniformity keep being central and are as important as efficiency or 
economy. The emerging governance relationships between the ministries and the 
institutes follow the ministerial and parliamentary accountability and the democratic 
control and the primacy of politics.  On the other hand, management boards in PI stress 
some of these points through the advisory and consultative boards bringing to the 
organisations the representatives of its societal and political context and looking for 
consensus about policy issues among different actors.  The relationships with the 
various actors in the public domain and the close links with their parent ministries 
provide a favourable ground for policy advice, having the presidents of the institutes a 
substantial policy role.  Hence, the changes are not producing a less coherent apparatus 
of governance as in most industrialised democracies, where changes are usually justified 
in terms of efficiency (Peters and Wright, 1998).  The legal, political and cultural 
context and the public values influence the mode of governance and the design of 
autonomisation maintaining the foundations of the public service. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The Portuguese autonomisation process and the emerging organisations were 
constrained by the institutional framework, which established the available options. The 
revitalisation of public institutes reinforces this idea.  The analysis shows that despite 
the pressure to improve policy implementation and, the influence of NPM, the 
constitutional, legal and established practices prevented the adoption of new 
organisational forms and extensive managerial changes. The change was primarily 
guided by values of the public domain, the juridical aspects and the primacy of politics, 
building a public governance which emphasises the role of politicians and opens the 
administrative system to the socio-political environment. 
This does not mean that the system is not enabled to innovate and introduce 
managerial flexibility.  The variety of models shows that each ministry sets up those 
characteristics, which respond to their particular problems creating ‘hybrid’ models of 
public institutes.  Public management is not restricted to effectiveness and efficiency 
reasons but, above all, by the values of the public domain.   
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